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The first iteration of risk parity, dubbed “All Weather” was introduced by Ray 
Dalio and his associates at Bridgewater Associates. The goal of the strategy is to create 
a diversified portfolio with equal risk distribution among asset classes so that high 
performance can be achieved through any period of economic uncertainty. The 
combination of risk-based allocation and use of leverage to boost expected returns has 
led to strong performance over long periods of time. After impressive performances 
during the modern day market crashes (2001 dot com bubble and 2008 financial crisis), 
the strategy gained in popularity among institutional investors. In this thesis, I will 
discuss the history of risk parity and its theoretical background versus other strategies, 
empirically analyze backtested risk parity portfolios, and discuss its performance during 
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Chapter 1: Understanding Risk Parity 
  On August 15, 1971, President Richard Nixon addressed the nation and 
announced that after twenty-seven years of monetary stability, the United States 
would break away from the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates which 
tied the paper dollar’s value to gold.1 Ray Dalio, who worked as a clerk on the New 
York Stock Exchange at the time, had anticipated the news bringing absolute chaos 
into the financial markets leading to stocks falling; however, the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (“DJIA”), which tracks the performance of thirty of the largest 
exchanges in the United States, experienced a 4% rally, which later became known 
as the Nixon rally. While Dalio was surprised by the market’s reaction, he came to 
realize that while announcements of this magnitude were unfamiliar to him, they 
were not unprecedented. The disconnect between Dalio’s expectations and the 
reality of the market influenced Dalio to dedicate himself to understanding the 
“timeless and universal relationships that both explain economic outcomes and 
repeat throughout history,” later described as the economic machine.2  
Dalio went on to found Bridgewater Associates, building the firm from a small 
risk management consulting business for corporate clients into nowadays, one of the 
largest asset management firms in the world. In his early work, it became evident that 
the company’s competitive edge would be their creativity in breaking down returns. 
Dalio and his team effectively produced research that explained how returns could be 
                                                        
1 “Nixon and the End of the Bretton Woods System, 1971–1973.” U.S. Department of State. U.S. 
Department of State. Accessed May 2, 2021. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/nixon-shock.  
2 Podolsky, Paul, Ryan Johnson, and Owen Jennings. “The All Weather Story.” Bridgewater. 




simplified by analyzing each component and examining each individual driver of said 
components.3 This came in its earliest form when Dalio devised a strategy to hedge the 
price of chicken by creating a synthetic future that would include the price of a chick, 
corn, and soymeal. It later followed by breaking down more traditional assets, such as 
treasury bond and corporate bond yields, as well as overall portfolio returns. He found 
that any portfolio return could be decomposed into three separate components: cash, 
beta (the compensation for bearing the market-wide systematic risk), and alpha (the 
additional value brought by the portfolio manager’s selection skills). The risk parity 
strategy specifically is about understanding the drivers of the beta component of 
portfolio returns. In particular, Dalio and his associates set out to identify a consistent 
way of beta asset allocation (proportions of the portfolio allocated to stocks, bonds, 
commodities, etc.) that would perform well across all economic environments (e.g., the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system). 
  
                                                        




Economic Shocks, Risk Balancing, and Performance of Asset Classes 
In order to create a portfolio that delivered the best chance of generating above 
average returns over time regardless of economic environment, Dalio and his team 
needed to come up with an approach that fell outside the realm of traditional investment 
strategies. Instead of relying on correlations and volatility assumptions, Bridgewater 
Associates turned to the simple truths of assets: 
1. Asset classes outperform cash over time. 
2. Asset prices discount future economic scenarios.4 
The first truth follows the basic principle of risk premium, which is the idea that 
a rational investor demands adequate compensation above the risk-free rate for taking 
on risk.5 The second follows the pricing of assets, which are said to reflect the 
discounted value of the expected future cash flows. The discounted cash flow aims to 
estimate the present value of an asset based on its ability to return value to investors 
through increased future cash flow generation.6 
Utilizing these two elements of pricing, Dalio and his associates set out to find 
the universal drivers causing the shifts in economic conditions. This is important 
because asset prices change due to unexpected shifts in market conditions and it is 
notoriously difficult to time the changes in the market. Although all risky assets deliver 
positive risk premia over the long run, different asset classes can have markedly 
                                                        
4 Bob Prince, “Risk Parity Is About Balance,” Bridgewater (Bridgewater, January 6, 2021), 
https://www.bridgewater.com/research-and-insights/risk-parity-is-about-balance, 2. 
5 Chen, James. “Market Risk Premium.” Investopedia. Investopedia, August 28, 2020. 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketriskpremium.asp.  







different reactions to any given economic shock over the short-term. To construct an 
effective diversified portfolio that could weather all market conditions, Dalio and his 
associates wanted to know how different asset classes would react to unexpected shifts 
in the market. 
Built on the learning outcomes of managing assets and liabilities over the years, 
Dalio and his associates identified two main drivers causing the unexpected shifts in 
economic conditions: growth shocks and inflation shocks. They also discovered that 
combining asset classes together can effectively offset and balance the overall risk of a 
portfolio. For example, stocks tend to perform poorly in economic contractions 
(negative growth shocks); however, pairing stocks with nominal bonds can mostly 
offset the loss in stock returns. Although nominal bonds help to offset the risk of 
economic contractions, both stocks and nominal bonds perform poorly in highly 
inflationary environments. Commodities and inflation-linked bonds, on the other hand, 
perform well when inflation rises, and therefore, can be utilized to effectively hedge the 
risk of inflation shocks.7 Combining these assets together creates a well-balanced 
portfolio. For illustration, the figure below displays the return correlation between three 
distinct asset classes (stock, treasury bonds, and commodities), demonstrating how 
balancing a portfolio centered around these assets can achieve high diversification 
benefits to minimize the effects of environmental shocks.8 
                                                        
7 Lee Patridge and Roberto Croce, “Risk Parity for the Long Run: Building Portfolios Designed to 
Perform Across Economic Environment,” Alternative Investment Analyst Review 1, no. 4 (2013): pp. 6-
17, 11. 





Figure 1: Correlation of Asset Returns 1958-2911. 
The figure above shows a correlation matrix for monthly returns on equity, commodity, 







The All Weather Portfolio 
In 1996, twenty-five years after President Nixon’s announcement, and twenty-
one years after the founding of Bridgewater Associates, Dalio and his team put together 
a fully formed “All Weather” portfolio. The name reflected the original intent of the 
strategy (capturing the long-term positive risk premium while weathering the storms of 
short-term economic shocks). The portfolio includes a variety of risky asset classes that 
each would respond somewhat differently to growth or inflation shocks. The portfolio 
weights are dynamically adjusted to ensure that the portfolio mains an equal risk 
exposure to each asset class over time. The figure below demonstrates the original asset 
class allocations of the All Weather portfolio with the asset classes grouped together 
based on how they historically performed during growth and inflation environments.9 
                                                        





Figure 2: The “All Weather” Portfolio. 
The figure above shows the allocations for the “All Weather” portfolio, broken down 
by asset type. The following assets are included: equities (stocks), commodities (raw 
materials), Corporate Credit (corporate bonds), EM Credit (emerging market bonds), IL 
Bonds (inflation-linked bonds), and nominal bonds (fixed-rate bonds). 
This novel asset allocation approach delivered an impressive track record, 
especially during the 2001 dot com crash and the 2008 financial crisis. As a result, 
strategy increased in popularity and experienced rapid growth in assets under 










Risk-Based vs. Dollar-Based Diversification 
The key insight from Dalio’s new diversification approach was the idea to 
allocate equally among asset classes in accordance to overall risk. This is a markedly 
different approach from the traditional dollar-based diversification strategy, which 
focuses on spreading capital across asset classes. For example, the widely popular 60/40 
strategy implements dollar-based diversification, allocating 60% of capital to stocks and 
40% to bonds. While there appears to be a benefit from a simplicity standpoint that 
favors the 60/40 strategy, the diversification benefit of the portfolio leaves much to be 
desired. The overall risk, measured by the volatility (standard deviation) of asset 
returns, shows that the large majority of risk is concentrated within equity. The inherent 
volatility of equity when compared to bonds leads to roughly 90% of risk being 
allocated in equity. The figure below shows the overall dollar and risk allocation of a 
more traditional portfolio following a strategy more closely aligned with 60/40.10 
                                                        
10 Brian Hurst, Bryant W Johnson, and Yao Hua Ooi, “Understanding Risk Parity,” AQR Capital 






Figure 3: Traditional Portfolios Heavily Concentrated in Equity Risk. 
The figure above illustrates an asset class allocation and corresponding risk allocation 
of a “traditional” portfolio. 
Such a high concentration in equity risk makes sense only if the risk premium of 
stocks is significantly higher than that of bonds. Evidence, based on a long series of 
historical data, seems to suggest that the risk premia for stocks and bonds are actually 
comparable, meaning the dollar-based strategy tends to be heavily loaded in equity risk. 
Due to this observation, the strategy fails to achieve true diversification. The risk-based 
diversification strategy involved in risk parity ultimately ends up placing a much larger 
weight on non-equity assets in order to equalize the risk among asset classes. This split 
often results in an allocation more along the lines of 85/15, where 85% of the portfolio 





The Importance of Leverage 
While the risk-based strategy produces a better risk-adjusted return than dollar-
based strategies, demonstrated by its higher Sharpe ratio, the overall risk parity portfolio 
delivers a much lower return due to its larger allocation to non-equity asset classes. In 
order to achieve a higher return, leverage, defined as the level of assets utilized above 
the amount of total equity invested (or borrowing money to invest), is applied to 
increase the expected return (as well as the volatility of the portfolio).11 A typical target 
volatility for the portfolio ranges from 10-15%, but can be set to match any level that is 
deemed fit by each individual’s risk aversion. After determining the desired amount of 
leverage, the additional capital is applied to the portfolio, keeping the ratio between 
equity and non-equity the same as it was while unlevered.  
Although it is difficult for retail investors to obtain leverage, it is widely used by 
institutional investors (e.g., hedge funds like Bridgewater Associates). The primary 
source of hedge fund leverage is through borrowing directly from prime brokers (e.g., 
Goldman Sachs), known as margin loans. Other ways include entering contractual 
agreements such as total return swaps, where one party agrees to make interest 
payments based on a set rate in return for another party committing to make payments 
based on the total return of the underlying assets.12 These agreements are often made 
with a bank, where the set rate is determined by the London Inter-bank Offered Rate 
(“LIBOR”) with an added premium. 
                                                        
11 Kat Tretina, “What Is Leverage?,” ed. Benjamin Curry, Forbes (Forbes Magazine, April 8, 2021), 
https://www.forbes.com/advisor/investing/what-is-leverage/. 
12 “Risk Parity Whitepaper,” Wealthfront Investment Methodology White Paper | Wealthfront 






In this thesis, I construct several risk parity strategies with and without leverage 
based on two asset classes: stocks and treasury bonds. I use a long time series of 
historical data to backtest the performance of these portfolios and compare it to an all-
stock and 60/40 portfolio. Through the analysis of the constructed portfolios, I find that 
the all-stock and 60/40 portfolios have higher average excess returns than the unlevered 
risk parity portfolio, but that the levered risk parity portfolios often achieve a higher 
excess return and Sharpe ratio with similar levels of volatility when compared the all-
stock and the 60/40 portfolios. However, in the early stages of the COVID-19 
Pandemic, the risk parity portfolios failed to live up to its name, ultimately failing to 
weather the unexpected economic storms. Although it experienced a quick recovery, the 
brief market crash proved that even with a long-term history of strong performance, risk 





Chapter 2: Theoretical Background - Risk Parity and the CAPM 
The CAPM Model 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”) was introduced by William Sharpe 
in 1964 and was built upon the work of Harry Markowitz’ Portfolio Selection Model. 
The CAPM effectively turns an algebraic statement into a prediction showing the 
relationship between risk and expected return of any risky asset. It utilizes all available 
assets to create an efficient frontier to plot each combination of asset’s risk-return 
relationship. Through this visualization, there exists an efficient frontier, which is the 
set of optimal portfolios that offer the highest expected return for any risk level targeted 
by the investor.13 Along the efficient frontier is the optimal portfolio, known as the 
tangency portfolio, where the Sharpe ratio is maximized. In equilibrium, this tangency 
portfolio turns out to be the market portfolio, which consists of all available assets 
weighted in proportion to each asset’s market capitalization. 
Once the tangency portfolio is identified, a risk free asset is added into the 
equation. Connecting the risk-free asset to the tangency portfolio creates the Capital 
Market Line (“CML”), which captures all possible combinations between the risk-free 
asset and the tangency portfolio. While the exact optimal allocation for an individual 
investor depends on their risk preference, it is highly recommended that all investors 
following the CAPM model invest in some combination of the risk-free asset and the 
tangency portfolio that lies on the efficient frontier. 
                                                        







While the theory of CAPM sounds promising, it fails to live up to standards in 
reality. The historical performance of the market portfolio differs greatly from the 
actual tangency portfolio, resulting in a lower Sharpe ratio and general 
underperformance. The deviation between expectations and reality largely is recognized 
due to the unrealistic assumptions made under the CAPM. One assumption is that all 
investors have an unrestricted amount of borrowing and lending potential. This is 
clearly not true because even many institutions (i.e. mutual funds and pension funds) 
are either not allowed to utilize leverage, or are not willing to. Due to the leverage 
constraint, many investors overweigh high risk assets in their portfolio to increase the 
expected returns. Such demand leads to overpricing of high risk assets and underpricing 





Opportunity for Investors with Leverage 
As leverage-averse investors tilt away from the optimal allocation as prescribed 
by the CAPM model and invest more in riskier assets, such as stocks, to enhance their 
returns, the excess demand for riskier assets drives up current prices, lowering the 
expected future returns. The opposite occurs for safer assets, such as bonds. By trading 
in an opposite fashion to leverage-averse investors, those who have easy access to 
leverage can devise a portfolio underweighing equity and overweighing non-equity 
before applying leverage to reach their desired return and volatility targets. As the 
actual market portfolio continues to deviate away from the theorized allocation levels, 
investors who are willing and able to use leverage realize risk-adjusted returns much 
closer to the tangency portfolio through the means of a risk-parity inspired investment 
strategy. The figure below demonstrates an efficient frontier devised of annualized 
figures over the period 1926 through 2010.14 
                                                        
14 Clifford S. Asness, Andrea Frazzini, and Lasse H. Pedersen, “Leverage Aversion and Risk Parity,” 






Figure 4: Efficient Frontier, 1926-2010. 
The figure above shows the efficient frontier of portfolios of U.S. stocks and bonds 




Chapter 3: Empirical Analysis – Backtesting a Simple Risk Parity 
Strategy 
In this chapter, I construct a simple risk parity strategy and use historical data to 
backtest its performance. In an ideal world, a risk parity strategy would begin by 
identifying the tangency portfolio as described in CAPM. Unfortunately, doing this 
before knowing the actual returns are realized is impossible. To counter this, the risk 
parity model offers an approximation by dynamically allocating the same amount of 
risk to stocks and bonds. The resulting allocations have been shown to be quite close to 
the average tangency portfolio. In practice, a risk parity strategy can include many asset 
classes and employ fancier allocation methods, but the underlying principles remain 
similar. For the purpose of this thesis, the simple risk parity strategy will include only 






Constructing the Simple Risk Parity Strategy: Methodology 
The simple risk parity strategy determines the portfolio weights by calculating a 
percentage inversely proportional to each asset class’ volatility, which serves as the 
estimation of risk. Specifically, I use the following equation to find the weight allocated 
to each asset class.15 
 
Equation 1: Weight Allocation 
w: the weight allocation for each asset within the portfolio 
k: the amount of leverage to be applied 
t: data up to month t-1within series under consideration 
i: i = 1, 2, 3, …, n 
ˆσ: standard deviation 
 
The parameter, k, in the equation above represents a time varying variable that 
controls the amount of leverage applied to the risk parity portfolio. The calculation of k 
depends on whether you are creating an unleveraged or leveraged risk parity portfolio, 
although the overall logic behind the calculation remains the same. The formula below 
defines the calculation for k for an unleveraged portfolio, which is calculated as the 






                                                        
15 Ibid., 57. 






Equation 2: Unleveraged k 
 
The second component in need of calculation is the volatility, defined by the 
standard deviation. To accomplish this, we define the volatility as the annualized three-
year monthly rolling standing deviation of excess returns. With this information now 
intact, we arrive at k by taking one divided by the sum of the inverse of the rolling 
standard deviations for each asset class.  
For a leveraged portfolio, k is set such that the annualized portfolio volatility 
matches the realized volatility of the benchmark in which the risk parity portfolio is 
attempting to match. This is accomplished by finding the annualized standard deviation 
of the excess returns of the benchmark strategy, seen through the formula below:17 
 
 
Equation 3: Leveraged k 
 
With the now calculated k, for both the unleveraged and leveraged portfolio, as 
well as the estimation of risk, the weight for each asset class can be finalized. Once that 
is achieved, the overall portfolio return can be calculated as the weighted average of 
excess returns across all asset classes. The formula to do so is seen below:18  
                                                        
17 Ibid., 57. 






Equation 4: Portfolio Return 
rt,i: asset return 
wt-1,i: asset weight 
rft: risk free rate 
 
Based on the methodology described above, I created five unique risk parity 
portfolios. The first is the unlevered risk parity portfolio. The remaining risk parity 
portfolios are designed to match the volatility of specific portfolio allocations. Two are 
created to match an all-stock allocation. An additional two are designed to match the 
volatility of a 60/40 portfolio. Within both classifications, that being all-stock and 
60/40, one of the models had the amount of leverage capped at 300% to align with the 





Backtested Performance  
To backtest the performance of the above mentioned five risk parity portfolios, I 
obtained monthly returns from 1930 to 2019 for the US Stock index returns and the US 
Treasury Bond index returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (“CRSP”). 
The summary statistics that will be analyzed to generalize performance will be the 
average excess returns in combination with the average standard deviations of excess 
returns. These two summary statistics for each analyzed period will be utilized to 
calculate the Sharpe ratio for each portfolio. While the Sharpe ratio is not the end-all be-
all metric to measure risk-adjusted performance, it has a sound theoretical foundation in 
the CAPM framework and is widely used by industry practitioners.  
 
The Unlevered Risk Parity Model 
 
Table 1: Unlevered Risk Parity Portfolio Statistics 
 
The unlevered risk parity model expectedly had the lowest average excess 
returns and average volatility of all constructed portfolios; however, performance seen 
through the Sharpe ratio would indicate it outperforms the traditional dollar allocated 
portfolios, all-stock and 60/40. This unleveraged portfolio served as the baseline for all 






The All-Stock Comparison 
 
Table 2: All-Stock Portfolio Comparison to Two Risk Parity Portfolios  
 
The above findings demonstrate conflicting results. The average annualized 
excess returns for a portfolio weighted 100% equity from 1930 to 2019 was 7.61%, 
which represents an outperformance of the more attainable risk parity model capped at 
three times leverage from a pure return standpoint. However, when taking into account 
the portfolio volatility, the picture becomes more unclear. The All-Stock portfolio had 
an average standard deviation of 18.4%, which is 52.4% more volatile than the risk 
parity model. While it ultimately depends on each investor’s tolerance for risk, the risk 
parity model delivered similar returns for substantially less risk, achieving a Sharpe 
ratio of 0.5931, representing a 43.3% outperformance of the generic All-Stock portfolio. 
Although unrealistic to attain, the uncapped risk parity portfolio greatly 
outperformed both the capped risk parity and generic all-stock portfolios from a return 
standpoint; however, it had 146.2% and 61.5% more volatility, respectively, than the 
all-stock and capped risk parity models. While visualized as achieving a higher Sharpe 
ratio, the slight difference between the two leveraged risk parity portfolios can be 
explained by estimation error. The amount of leverage should not influence the realized 
Sharpe ratio. 
The charts seen below will show visual representation of the three portfolios 





Sharpe ratio, average stock allocation, and average bond allocation in increments of ten 
year periods. 
 
Figure 5: Average Excess Returns Comparison, All-Stock vs. Risk Parity Portfolios 
 
 








Figure 7: Average Sharpe Ratio Comparison, All-Stock vs. Risk Parity Portfolios 
 
 







Figure 9: Average Bond Allocation, All-Stock vs. Risk Parity Portfolios 
 
 
The ten-year subperiod performances as seen above demonstrate the risk parity 
portfolio’s ability to perform well over the long haul. Although it did not beat the all-
stock portfolio for every ten-year period, from 1930-2019, there were four sub-periods 
in which the capped risk parity portfolio achieved higher excess returns. Over the same 
period, there was only one instance in which the volatility for the capped risk parity 
portfolio was higher than the all-stock portfolio. This leads to a higher Sharpe ratio for 
the capped risk parity portfolio in seven of the nine analyzed sub-periods.  
Since the release of the All Weather portfolio in 1996, the risk parity strategy 
has outperformed the all-stock portfolio. Looking at the 2000-2009 sub-period in which 
the United States suffered two market crashes (2001 dot com bubble and 2008 financial 





stock portfolio which realized negative excess returns. The portfolio achieved this while 







The 60/40 Comparison 
 
Table 3: 60/40 Portfolio Comparison to Two Risk Parity Portfolios 
Differing from the All-Stock comparisons, the above findings demonstrate a 
more clear-cut picture from a performance standpoint. The average annualized excess 
returns for a portfolio weighted 60% stock and 40% bond from 1930 to 2019 was 5.2%, 
which represents an underperformance of the more attainable risk parity model capped 
at three times leverage from a pure return standpoint. When taking a broader lens and 
incorporating the portfolio volatility, the picture remains clear. With an average 
annualized standard deviation of 11.26%, the generic 60/40 portfolio is only four basis 
points less volatile than the capped risk parity model. For a similar volatility, the capped 
risk parity model delivered a 6.71% annualized return, representing a 29.0% 
outperformance of the generic 60/40 portfolio. From a risk-return basis, the capped risk 
parity portfolio delivered with a Sharpe ratio of 0.5938, representing a 28.4% increase 
from the generic portfolio. 
Although unrealistic, the uncapped risk parity portfolio greatly outperformed 
both the capped risk parity and generic 60/40 portfolios from a return standpoint; 
however, it had 61.0% and 61.5% more volatility, respectively, than the generic all-
stock and capped risk parity models. While visualized as achieving a higher Sharpe 
ratio, the slight difference between the two leveraged risk parity portfolios can be 






The charts seen below will show visual representation of the three portfolio’s 
performance through average excess returns, average standard deviation, average 


















Figure 10: Average Excess Returns Comparison, 60/40 vs. Risk Parity Portfolios 
 
 







Figure 12: Average Sharpe Ratio, 60/40 vs. Risk Parity Portfolios 
 
 







Figure 14: Average Bond Allocation Comparison, 60/40 vs. Risk Parity Portfolios 
 
The ten-year subperiod performances as seen above demonstrate the risk parity 
portfolio’s ability to perform well over the long haul. Although it did not beat the 60/40 
portfolio for every ten-year period, from 1930-2019, there were seven sub-periods in 
which the capped risk parity portfolio achieved higher excess returns. Over the same 
period, there were three instances in which the volatility for the capped risk parity 
portfolio was higher than the all-stock portfolio. This led to a higher Sharpe ratio for the 
capped risk parity portfolio in seven of the nine analyzed sub-periods. 
Since the release of the All Weather portfolio in 1996, the risk parity strategy 
has outperformed the 60/40 portfolio, achieving higher excess returns on lower 
volatility and a higher Sharpe ratio. The overall consistency of the risk parity portfolio 
proves that the performance can be stable over time and is not entirely driven by one, or 





Chapter 4: COVID-19 Pandemic Performance 
The outbreak of COVID-19 was officially declared a global pandemic on March 
11, 2020 by the World Health Organization. The market, realizing the potential chaos it 
could cause, started to react about three weeks prior, beginning the COVID-19 market 
sell-off on February 20, 2020. Over the course of a one month period from February 20 
to March 20, 2020, the DIJA index plummeted just under 34%. Most of the activity 
occurred over three days, Black Monday (March 9), Black Thursday (March 12), and 
Black Monday II (March 16) where the DIJA dropped 7.79%, 9.99%, and 12.93%, 
respectively.19 Much of the sell-off was fear driven as the United States imposed 
quarantines on the population and ordered shut-downs of business activity as a means of 
safeguarding the public. At the time, these decisions led to a drastic rise in the rate of 
unemployment, reaching heights above 20%, directly contributing to sharp declines in 
GDP of 5.0% and 31.7% over quarter one and quarter two of 2020.20  
As stocks were plummeting, it was assumed that the treasury bond market 
would pick up steam due to is historical status of being one of the most liquid and safe 
assets in the world. The negative beta of Treasury bonds over recent decades made that 
assumption feel like a certainty; however, the reality of the situation differed greatly. 
The events during March 2020 did not follow the traditional reactions seen in previous 
                                                        
19 Mieszko Mazur, Man Dang, and Miguel Vega, “COVID-19 and the March 2020 Stock Market Crash. 
Evidence from S&P1500,” Finance research letters (Elsevier Inc., January 2021), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7343658/#cit_3. 
20 “Gross Domestic Product, 2nd Quarter 2020 (Second Estimate); Corporate Profits, 2nd Quarter 2020 









market crashes. In this short period of time, the stock market fell dramatically, the 
volatility index (VIX) spiked, credit spreads widened, the dollar appreciated, and prime 
money market funds experienced outflows.21 The price of long-term Treasury securities 
fell sharply as the Treasury yield increased 60 basis points, resulting in an unusual 
positive correlation between the stock and bond market returns.  
As stock and bonds both fell, a large majority of commodities followed suit. The 
sudden halt of economic activity with expected threats of global slowdown caused 
commodities linked to energy, metals, transportation, and agriculture to fall.22 The 
stoppage of the economy played hand-in-hand with supply chain issues and government 
intervention.  
Combined, the three asset classes all performed poorly. The risk parity model, 
designed to withstand major disruptions to the economy regardless of uncertainty, failed 
to live up to expectations. The table below demonstrates the performance of different 
risk parity mutual funds, as well as domestic and global 60/40 portfolios during the 
peak of the COVID-19 market crash.23  
                                                        
21 He, Zhiguo, Stefan Nagel, and Zhaogang Song. “Treasury Inconvenience Yields during the COVID-19 
Crisis.” NBER working paper, June 2020, 1. 
22 “Most Commodity Prices to Drop in 2020 As Coronavirus Depresses Demand and Disrupts Supply,” 
World Bank, April 23, 2020, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/04/23/most-
commodity-prices-to-drop-in-2020-as-coronavirus-depresses-demand-and-disrupts-supply. 
23 “Quant Funds in the Coronavirus Market Rout: Risk Parity,” Quant Funds in COVID Market Rout | 








Figure 15: Risk Parity Indices Performance During COVID-19 Pandemic 
 
This shows that there are still unforeseen economic shocks that can break down 
the presumed correlation patterns between asset classes. The lesson learned from this, is 
that despite the stellar historical performance of risk parity portfolios, it is still not a 
perfect strategy that effectively weathers all of the storms. We still have a long way to 








  Chapter 5: Conclusion 
After years of studying the makeup of the economic machine, Ray Dalio and his 
associates released the first edition of a risk parity portfolio, known as “All Weather”. 
By utilizing a risk-allocation as opposed to a dollar-allocation, the risk parity model 
achieves true diversification. This allocation based on risk results in a portfolio heavily 
dominated in inherently less risky assets. While this leads to high performance from a 
maximization of Sharpe ratio standpoint, the actual returns of an unleveraged portfolio 
fail to impress. By applying leverage to match the desired volatility of an investor, the 
risk parity model generates higher risk-adjusted returns than other portfolio 
compositions.   
Designed to weather the storms of any economic uncertainty, the risk parity 
portfolio failed to live up to its name during the COVID-19 market crash. The break 
down between stock and bond correlations in the early stages of the pandemic posed a 
challenge unforeseen to investors. Although it was quick to recover, along with much of 
the market, the underperformance led many to question its viability for future market 
downturns; however, with a long-term focus, it is easy to understand just how beneficial 
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